In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines
the pleasure and pain for acting in conformity with virtue. Aristotle can be referring
to a politician acting in conformity with the virtue of generosity but feeling
pain when doing so; this person cannot be considered virtuous. It is only the
man who feels pleasure from acting in conformity with various virtues that is
considered virtuous. A man, who performs these actions in conformity with
virtue in pain, is not considered to be virtuous. However, throughout the text,
this definition is secondary to that of performing the actions in conformity
with the virtue is enough to be considered virtuous. In my opinion, the
presence of pleasure or pain should be the most important baseline in deciding
whether a person is virtuous or not.In
order for an individual to be considered virtuous he must perform actions in
conformity with said virtue at the right moment, at the right time, to the
right people; he must first possess the virtue of prudence. Being generous is
enough to be considered to have the virtue of generosity; it does not matter
whether he gives in a jovial manner or in a sour manner. Essentially the
baseline for have the virtue is exercising it – whether or not he feels pain or
pleasure is an added bonus. However, it is not enough to just exercise the action
that exemplifies the virtue; it should be a necessity to feel pleasure when acting
out the virtue. Only then, can a man be considered virtuous. A man acting
courageously in pain should still be noted as a coward; a man acting pain with
the virtue of self-control is self-indulgent. Frankly why should a cheerfully generous man
and a meanly generous man both possess the virtue of generosity? This is not to
say that a man who feels pain when exercising a virtue will always feel pain.
In the following chapter, Aristotle talks about “Habit is the virtue.” As a
support of the previous chapter with pleasure and pain, the habit is the virtue
allows one who starts with feeling pain in acting in conformity with the virtue
eventually start to feel pleasure. For example, in the exercise of
self-control, I can wake up on the first ring of my alarm clock. Waking up at
six in the morning is not going to be a pleasant experience, but soon after
being productive with the few extra hours I have, I will start to look forward
to waking up and the act itself of waking up is pleasurable. At this stage, I
finally possess the virtue of self-control; not as Aristotle says I possess it
when I first wake up. So all in all, there stands
Aristotle’s conclusion that albeit the state of mind the individual was in
while performing the action, he is considered to possess the virtue. In
contrast, I believe the only ay that one can fully attain virtue in their
actions is by feeling pleasure through the exercise of said virtue.
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